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Abstract
We show in a two-period world with endogenous savings and two assets,
one of them exhibiting a stochastic return that an interest adjusted income
tax is optimal. This tax leaves a safe component of interest income tax free
and taxes the excess return with a special tax rate. There is no trade-off
between risk allocation and efficiency in intertemporal consumption. Both
goals are reached. As the resulting tax system divides income into three
parts, the tax can also be called a Triple Income Tax. This distinction and a
special tax rate on the excess return is necessary in order to have an optimal
risk shifting effect.
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1 Introduction
There is an old but still ongoing debate on the best tax system in most OECD
countries. Especially in Germany and the USA there are proponents of a con-
sumption orientated taxation on the one hand and defenders of the comprehensive
income taxation on the other. In a major reform, the Nordic countries have imple-
mented a Dual Income Tax, which apportions total income in segmented tax bases
of labor and capital income (see. i.e., Sørensen, 1994). In all cases, however, this
debate does not consider the effects of risk in personal income and therefore does
not deal with risky tax revenue. Consequently, the questions we want to answer
in this paper are: First, what is the optimal income taxation in case of aggregate
risk? Second, which tax system should therefore be implemented?
In a world without uncertainty and distributional considerations the optimal
tax structure for financing public expenditure is lump sum. In case of uncertainty
about the individual wage rate, so called private risk which is unsystematic and
can be insured, this statement does not hold. Eaton and Rosen (1980) showed
in their seminal paper that for a one-period world with endogenous labor choice
an income tax with a strictly positive marginal tax rate improves welfare. The
government pools the private risk of all individuals and uses a lump sum transfer
in order to return the deterministic tax revenue. The income tax takes the function
of a social insurance scheme against private risk. Varian (1980) showed similar
effects for a two-period world where the households work for a known wage rate
and have to choose between consumption and savings. In his analysis, individuals
face private risk because of uncertainty about the best investment portfolio.
The risk category however, we are interested in, is aggregate risk. This risk is
systematic and hits all agents at the same time and in the same manner. There-
fore, no insurance is possible, but incurring this risk pays out a risk premium.
Amazingly, there are only few contributions to this topic. Richter and Wiegard
(1991) examine a model with endogenous savings. In their two-period model the
households have inelastic labor supply in period zero and divide their exogenous
labor income between consumption and savings. Consumption in the following
period is financed by savings and a stochastic interest income. Richter and Wie-
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gard show that a tax on this risky interest income improves welfare under certain
conditions – even in world with exogenous labor supply. The optimal tax rate is
a trade-off between efficiency and insurance. Therefore, it depends on the elastic-
ity of current consumption with respect to a compensated relative change of the
tax rate. Further they show that a consumption tax cannot achieve this insurance
function. Related studies have been done by Richter (1992). He examines the
portfolio choice decision in a two asset world with one exhibiting a stochastic re-
turn and one safe asset. Richter develops an optimal elasticity rule for the taxation
of asset returns and demonstrates that a cash flow tax is not optimal, if tax rates
are not differentiated. Unfortunately, these papers assume risk neutrality in public
consumption. Hence, they collapse to the case of private risk and are limited in
their statements concerning risky tax bases. Christiansen (1993), instead, points
out some optimal tax rules for portfolio choice in case of risk aversion in public
consumption, but his approach cannot be linked to tax systems, mentioned above.
All these papers suggest that in case of uncertainty a consumption tax is al-
ways inferior compared to an income tax. This is because an income tax provides
superior insurance by taxing capital income and the sacrifice of a distorted in-
tertemporal consumption decision is more than compensated by the reduction of
risk. However, looking at the capital taxation used, in all papers the return in each
single asset is liable to one separated tax rate. Thus, they are not able to deal with
risk effects separately, as we point out in the next section.
We show in our paper that the sacrifice of efficiency is not necessary. First,
by using a adequately defined tax system, we can achieve both insurance and
intertemporal efficiency. Second, we are able to show, that the resulting optimal
tax scheme is a modern form of consumption taxation. Precisely, we will get
a kind of consumption-orientated income tax with interest adjustment (see i.e.,
Rose 1999, pp. 35ff). Furthermore, we can state that a consumption tax is able to
insure against risk in capital income in an optimal manner.
The remainder of the paper will be as follows. In section 2 we present the
model and examine the household choice, whereas section 3 discusses the optimal
tax structure for a welfare maximum. The paper closes with some conclusions.
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2 The Model and Household Choice
We use a two-period model without any bequest motive. There is a homogenous
individual, receiving exogenous labor income y in period one and dividing it on
first period consumption c0 and savings s0. Savings can be invested in an asset A0
with a certain return r > 0 and in a risky asset A1, which has a stochastic return
x˜ ≥−1. We assume E[x˜]> r. Savings are the only source of consumption in the
second period.
The government can use both a proportional wage tax tL in the first period1 and
a tax on capital income. For capital income taxation we follow the approach of
Hilgers and Schindler (2002) and use a two-part interest income tax. We tax the
riskless return r in both assets with rate t0 and the excess return (x˜−r) with rate t1
and assume full loss offset. If the realization of the excess return is negative, this
loss will lead to a tax refund of t1 · (x˜− r).
The motivation for the design of the capital tax system is as follows: The in-
vestor does not invest in assets in order to own the assets. On one hand, she does
investments in order to shift resources into the future for financing future con-
sumption. However, postponing consumption creates some kind of disutility as
long as her marginal rate of time preference is positive and she has therefore to
be compensated for giving up present consumption. The price of this compensa-
tion for resource shifting equals the riskless rate of return and is paid out by both
the riskless asset and the risky one. On the other hand, the investor can expand
her income for future consumption by buying asset A1 and incurring risk. Risk
creates disutility and for incurring this risk the investor receives a risk premium.
After realization of risk, this price for risk equals the excess return x˜− r, which
can be negative in bad states of the world. Hence, the investor gets additional
(risk-)income (x˜− r) ·A1 according to her risk preferences which is positive in
expected values. Taken together the prices for resource shifting and risk are liable
to two separated tax rates under our tax system, whereas in most former papers
the assets’ returns are liable to asset-specific tax rates. This means for the risky
1This wage tax is equivalent to a lump sum tax.
3
asset that the prices mentioned are mixed and taxed at one rate. If so however, no
separated treatment of risk is possible.2
The savings can now be written as s0 = A0 +A1 = (1− tL)y− c0. Consump-
tion in period 1 is c˜1 = [(1− t1)(x˜− r)A1 +[1+ r(1− t0)]] ((1− tL)y− c0). We
assume that the representative investor is risk averse in both private and public
consumption and her von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function takes the form
W = E [U(c0, c˜1, g˜)] with Uc > 0;Ucc < 0;Ug > 0;Ugg < 0.
Furthermore, we assume that future consumption and the public good are comple-
ments, Uc1g,Ugc1 ≥ 0.
In this model, the government chooses the tax rates and the tax revenue is
used completely to finance the public good in period 1. Therefore, the probability
distribution of g˜ is also an instrument variable of the government.
The household maximizes his expected utility W for given tax rates by choos-
ing her optimal first period consumption c0 and her optimal savings A0 +A1 =
(1− tL)y− c0 with respect to her budget constraint. She does not anticipate the
effect of her saving behavior on the level of the public good. Inserting the budget
constraint for c˜1, the maximization problem can be written as
max
c0,A1
W = E
[
U(c0,(1− t1)(x˜− r)A1 +[1+ r(1− t0)]((1− tL)y− c0), g˜)
]
. (1)
The first order conditions of the household problem are:
∂W
∂c0
= E [Uc0]−E [Uc1 · [1+ r(1− t0)]] = 0 (2)
∂W
∂A1
= (1− t1)E [Uc1 · (x˜− r)] = 0 (3)
Optimal values of c, A1 and s are denoted c0 = c0(t0, t1, tL), A1 = A1(t0, t1, tL)
and s0 = s0(t0, t1, tL). For the marginal rate of time preference we obtain:
ρ = E [Uc0]
E [Uc1]
−1 = r(1− t0) (4)
2In the Hilgers/Schindler model there is no labor income, but the tax system for capital income
is equivalent to our approach. The idea is to have enough instruments for pursuing two goals,
namely an optimal resource allocation as well as an efficient risk diversification.
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Equation (3) indicates that our tax system does not distort portfolio choice, as
the FOC is equal to the optimality condition in case of no taxation.
Proposition 1 The tax rate t1 on the excess return (x˜− r) does not affect
overall savings s0(t0, t1, tL) as ∂c0∂t1 = 0. Further, t1 has only a Musgrave-
substitution effect on A1 and ∂A1∂t1 =
A1
1−t1 .
Proof: Let pr = 1+ r(1− t0) and pA = (1− t1)(x˜− r). Totally differentiating
equations (2) and (3) with respect to c0, A1 and t1 gives:E [Uc0c0 −Uc0c1 pr −Uc1c0 pr +Uc1c1 p2r ] E [Uc0c1 pA−Uc1c1 pr pA]
E [Uc1c0 pA−Uc1c1 pA pr] E
[
Uc1c1
p2A
1−t1
]  · (dc0
dA1
)
=
=
E [Uc0c1 pA1−t1 −Uc1c1 pr pA1−t1 ]
E
[
Uc1c1
p2A
(1−t1)2
]  · A1 ·dt1 (5)
Using Cramer’s Rule, we get ∂c0∂t1 = 0, as the modified determinant det αdt1A1 in
the nominator equals zero, and ∂A1∂t1 =
A1
1−t1 as det αc0dt1 = det αc0A1 ·
A1
1−t1 . 2
This result corresponds to the result for taxing capital gains in Sandmo (1969,
Section 8) and is similar to the portfolio choice result for a net tax in case of several
risky assets (Sandmo, 1977). By investing more in the risky asset according to
∂A1
∂t1 =
A1
1−t1 and diminishing the investment in the riskless asset by the same amount
and therefore keeping both first period and second period consumption constant,
the tax rate change in t1 does not change expected utility of the household.
3 Optimal Taxes on Interest Income
The government collects tax revenue not only from capital taxation in period 1 but
also from the wage tax in the first period. However, all spending for the public
good take place in period 1 only. Hence, we assume that the tax revenue of the
wage tax in period 0 is invested entirely in the safe asset.3 Thus, in period 1, the
3This may be interpreted as a short cut for an overlapping-generations model, where the gov-
ernment provides an old-generation specific public good and where riskless rate of return equals
population growth in steady-state. See, e.g., Sandmo (1985), Section 7.
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government’s budget restriction can be written:
g˜ = (1+ r)tL · y+ t1(x˜− r) ·A1(t0, t1, tL)+ t0r · ((1− tL)y− c0(t0, t1, tL))
The government chooses now the tax rates and the public good g in order to max-
imize the social welfare function:
Ω = E
[
U(c0(t0, t1, tL), c˜1(t0, t1, tL), g˜)
]
given optimal household choice and subject to its budget restriction. We get the
following optimization problem:
max
t0,t1,tL
E
[
U(c0(.), c˜1(.),(1+ r)tL · y+ t1(x˜− r) ·A1(.)+ t0r · ((1− tL)y− c0(.))
] (6)
By using optimal household choice (2) and (3), we get as first order conditions:
E
[
−Uc1r · s0 +Ug ·
(
(t1(x˜− r) · ∂A1∂t0 + r · s0 + t0r ·
∂co
∂t0
)]
= 0(7)
E
[
Ug ·
(
(x˜− r) ·A1 + t1(x˜− r) · ∂A1∂t1 + t0r ·
∂c0
∂t1
)]
= 0(8)
E
[
−Uc1 [1+ r(1− t0)]+Ug ·
(
[1+ r(1− t0)]+ t1(x˜− r) · ∂A1∂tL + t0r ·
∂c0
∂tL
)]
= 0(9)
As ∂A1∂t1 =
A1
1−t1 and
∂c0
∂t1 = 0 from Proposition 1, (8) can be rewritten as:
E [Ug · (x˜− r)] · A11− t1 = 0. (10)
Then, we can conclude from using (10) and simplified versions of (7) and (9) :
Proposition 2 An optimal income tax system in case of exogenous labor
income and risky returns to at least one asset does not tax the riskless
rate of return (t0 = 0). The optimal tax rate on the excess return (x˜− r)
is strictly positive and in the open interval t1 ∈ (0;1), if the households are
risk averse in both private and public consumption. The wage tax is used
to equate marginal utility of public and private consumption in period 1.
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Proof: see Appendix.
If t1 is set optimally, we have Cov(Uc1, x˜) = Cov(Ug, x˜). As the households are
risk averse in both private and public consumption, in an optimum, the risk must
be diversified on both types of consumption. This diversification depends on the
relative strength of the risk aversion in private consumption compared to the one
in public consumption. Therefore, the tax rate t1 depends on this relative strength:
The higher the risk aversion in private consumption relative to the one in public
consumption, the higher the tax rate on the excess return (x˜− r) .
As the government returns the risk to the households by providing a public
good, our result is general and independent of any assumption whether the gov-
ernment can deal better with risk than the capital market. Furthermore, because of
providing an additional asset (the public good), which cannot be provided by the
capital market, the tax on the risk component is not neutral for the government and
achieves positive tax revenue in expected values. Hence, Gordon’s (1985) result
does not hold in our model.4
Bulow and Summers (1984) state that most risk is embedded in economic de-
preciations which are not liable to taxation. Thus, the government would not
participate in the risk and there is no insurance effect of taxation. This is true for
corporate taxation, using statutory depreciation rates. However, we tax ex-post
capital income, where the risky rate of return depends on the economic value of
the underlying firm.5 Thus, the government fully participates in all income risk
and the critic of Bulow and Summers (1984) does not apply. But, if we assume
risk neutrality in public consumption and marginal utility of future consumption
is independent of stochastic fluctuations in the level of the public good, we get
as special case t1 = 1 and all risk is concentrated in public consumption. This
would be in accordance with the Arrow-Lind Theorem, where the government
can diversify aggregate risk perfectly. Finally, we can state:
Proposition 3 If an interest adjusted income tax is implemented, taxing
the excess return according to Proposition 2 (t1 ∈ (0;1)) and letting the
4See Kaplow (1994), p. 795.
5Assume asset 1 as a stock. Then its return x˜ reflects the firm’s fluctuating value.
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riskless component of interest yield tax free (t0 = 0), an efficient risk allo-
cation is achieved without disturbing the intertemporal consumption deci-
sion. There is no trade-off between risk and efficiency in allocation. The
marginal rate of time preference equals the riskless rate of return (ρ = r).
Proof: From (4), the marginal rate of time preference is ρ = r ·(1−t0). For t0 = 0,
ρ = r. In the optimum, the marginal rate of time preference is then independent
of the tax rates and the intertemporal consumption decision is not distorted. Ad-
ditionally, Cov(Uc1, x˜) = Cov(Ug, x˜) assures efficient risk allocation. 2
As mentioned above, the literature shows that a consumption-orientated taxa-
tion cannot achieve the insurance function of a traditional income tax in case of
risky capital income. But is it true that an income tax always yields better results?
Examining our analysis, this view must be handled with care.
We use a proportional wage tax on exogenous labor income in the first period.
The safe rate of return on savings is tax-free, whereas the excess return or super-
normal profits are taxed with a special tax rate. This tax scheme equals a modified
consumption-orientated income tax with interest adjustment.6 Therefore, we have
a consumption tax, which optimally provides insurance against risky capital in-
come and simultaneously avoids a distortion in the intertemporal consumption
decision.
This tax scheme is an extension of the Dual Income Tax approach and can be
named a Triple Income Tax as we divide the full income in three different parts.
The excess return (or risk premium) is one of it. This distinction is necessary for
achieving an optimal risk allocation by taxation.7
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. On the one hand, it is
optimal to diversify the aggregate risk between private and public consumption.
6A consumption-orientated income tax with interest adjustment taxes the overall labor income
and tax-exempts interest income. For excess returns in capital income a tax with the same tax rate
as for labor income is possible. See i.e., Rose 1999, pp. 35ff.
7Calling a tax system Triple Income Tax, where one tax rate equals nil, seems not to be very
intuitive on first sight. However, the tax system is also suitable in case of an extended model using
endogenous labor choice. Then, all three tax rates are positive.
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On the other hand, risk shifting has negative welfare effects by disturbing the
intertemporal consumption decision, if we tax the risky asset with only one tax
rate. In this case, there is a trade-off and the optimal tax rate depends on the
strength of these effects. If we instead tax the excess return with a special tax
rate, the tax system is well defined and the trade-off can be avoided. Thus, we
reach both optimal risk allocation and efficiency in intertemporal consumption
simultaneously.
4 Conclusions
We showed that an interest adjusted income tax can guarantee a welfare maximum
in a two-period world with two assets, one of them exhibiting a stochastic return.
The excess return must be taxed separately and possible losses in this tax base
must be subsidized. In case of risk aversion in public consumption, we have
an inner optimum with t1 ∈ (0;1) because the risk must be diversified on both
consumption types for having an optimal risk allocation.
As such a tax system is a kind of indirect consumption taxation, we showed that
a consumption tax is able to insure against risky interest income. Furthermore, the
tax system can be called Triple Income Tax, because it uses three separated tax
bases. This extension of the Dual Income Tax approach is due to considering risk
effects in personal income and tax revenue explicitly. Although not done in the
paper, it is straightforward to show that these results also prevail in a multi-asset
world.
The tax system has an interesting advantage from a political point of view. In
public opinion there is usually major support for taxing supernormal profits in
capital income, whereas, at least in Germany, such capital gains are mostly tax
free at the moment. Now, this paper shows that taxing excess returns can be done
in a welfare-enhancing manner without effecting utility of private consumption.
Therefore, the risk tax creates no incentives for households to engage in tax plan-
ning. However, a disadvantage of our tax system may be that individuals have
an incentive to declare labor income as preferred taxed riskless capital income in
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order to avoid taxes. This problem is similar to the case of a Dual Income Tax
with separate tax rates for labor and capital income (see, i.e., Sørensen, 1994).
Related work can be done in a multi-asset world with a fixed amount of savings.
In such a world, Richter (1992) and Christiansen (1993) show that there is a trade-
off between risk allocation and optimal portfolio choice. If the same tax system is
introduced as in this paper, this trade-off should also be overcome.8 Further work
could also examine a multi-asset world with endogenous savings and labor-supply.
Another interesting topic emerges if we look at further work concerning het-
erogenous households. The taxation of the excess return effects utility solely by
public consumption. Despite this, the risk tax can be used for redistribution, if
individuals with lower income have higher preferences for the public good than
high-income households. Here, redistribution is to be thought as enhancing utility
of low-income households, which is possible by increasing the risk tax and creat-
ing higher tax revenue in expected values. Contrary to the traditional literature on
redistribution we get an instrument which avoids any trade-off between efficiency
and redistribution, but society has to pay for it with increased risk in consumption.
5 Appendix: Proof to Proposition 2
In proving Proposition 2 we use (10) in FOC (7) and (9) and obtain E [Ug−Uc1] ·
r · s0 +E [Ug] · t0r · ∂co∂t0 = 0 and E [Ug−Uc1] · [1+ r(1− t0)]+E [Ug] · t0r ·
∂c0
∂tL = 0.
Combining these expressions results in
t0 ·
(
[1+ r(1− t0)] ∂c0∂t0 − r · s0
∂c0
∂tL
)
= 0. (11)
Household’s budget constraint can be displayed as
c˜1 + pr · c0 = (1− t1)(x˜− r)A1 + pr · (y−a), (12)
where pr = [1+ r(1− t0)] is the price of present consumption, pr · y is the value
of endowment, pr ·a = pr · tLy is the lump-sum tax payment, induced by the wage
tax, and I = pr(y−a) is full income.
8See, for example, Hilgers and Schindler (2002) for a first analysis.
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Thus, ∂c0∂t0 =
∂c0
∂pr (−r) and we define
∂c0
∂tL =
∂c0
∂a because
∂c0
∂tL is a pure income
effect as long as labor supply is exogenous. Using the Slutsky equation for ∂c0∂pr
and endowment effects in equation (11), the income effects cancel out and we are
left with the substitution effect:
t0 · (pr · (−r) ·Sc0c0) = 0 (13)
and therefore unambiguously t0 = 0, as Sc0c0 < 0 as long as the tax on riskless
return is not another lump-sum tax.
For t0 = 0, from (7) and (9) then follows E[Uc1] = E[Ug]. Using FOC (3) of the
household problem and (10), we can write
E [Uc1 · (x˜− r)] = 0 = E [Ug · (x˜− r)] . (14)
As E[Y ·Z] = E[Y ] ·E[Z]+Cov(Y,Z) and E[Uc1] = E[Ug], this expression can
be simplified to Cov(Uc1, x˜) = Cov(Ug, x˜). But, this is only possible for t1 ∈ (0;1).
2
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